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JENNAH KHALED2
THE REFERENCE POWER HAS, suddenly, become the fascination of the legal 
academic community in Canada. Two books on the subject were published in 
2019 from different and complementary perspectives. Together, they represent 
a novel inquiry into a power that is exercised differently in Canada than it is in 
any other country. The reference, wherein courts consider questions put to them 
directly instead of in the context of appeals of cases, is a power that has been 
deployed to great effect on a variety of landmark issues, from appellate courts 
up to the Supreme Court of Canada. But this power is not well understood. 
Published within several months of each other, these two books fill a gap in our 
understanding of the power that “engage[s] a declaratory function in perhaps its 
purest sense—not in the service of mediation of a particular dispute, but with 
the intention of clarifying a point of uncertainty so that everyone knows how 
the law may be applied to their future projects and decisions.”3 These words 
1. Carissima Mathen, Courts Without Cases: The Law and Politics of Advisory Opinions (Hart 
Publishing, 2019); Kate Puddister, Seeking the Court’s Advice: The Politics of the Canadian 
Reference Power (UBC Press, 2019).
2. J.D. Candidate (2021), Osgoode Hall Law School.
3. Mathen, supra note 1 at 235-36. 
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are attributable to Carissima Mathen, Professor in the University of Ottawa’s 
common law program, and they appear in Courts Without Cases: The Law and 
Politics of Advisory Opinions.
Mathen’s book focuses on how “advisory opinions draw courts into the 
complex relationship between law and politics.”4 Of the two monographs, this 
is the one that provides the more traditional legal analysis and offers a strong 
narrative-driven qualitative assessment of the reference power. Mathen is a 
seasoned law professor whose agility and breadth of knowledge is on full display 
in this work. The volume is short, but it is packed with historical background 
and analysis. No sentence is wasted, and Mathen’s writing is as engaging as it 
is informative. 
Part of what makes Mathen’s work essential is that she digs deep into some 
of the most important questions about references: what are they, how did they 
develop, and what status do they have in relation to traditional cases at common 
law? In chapter ten, The Advisory Court, Mathen argues that references, while 
technically advisory opinions and not decisions, have evolved for several reasons, 
both “cultural” and “pragmatic,” and have the same status as regular common law 
cases.5 Mathen writes:
[I]n important ways, a Canadian advisory opinion and a judicial decision are 
substantively indistinguishable. It makes little difference, to a party’s future legal 
position, whether a judicial resolution has emerged from one proceeding and not the 
other. That is because courts themselves do not draw such distinctions. The advisory 
opinion about the nature of Charter rights in, say, the Motor Vehicle Reference receives 
no less regard than rulings in ordinary ‘live’ cases such as R v Oakes or R v Therens. 
Courts treat the former reference as an authoritative statement of law.6
This conclusion may be accepted by many legal practitioners and academics, but 
often, it is hard for many to explain why and how references came to have binding 
force. Mathen tracks the evolution and process by which references have come to 
bind governments. In a series of chapters, Mathen treads the long historical trail 
that informs our modern conception of the reference. Her fascinating account 
looks at the Norman-era Magnum Concilium, a council of advisors that was 
composed to offer advisory opinions to the English King,7 through the creation 
of the Judicial Committee of the Pricy Council in 1833, whose enabling statute 
4. “About: Courts Without Cases: The Law and Politics of Advisory Opinions,” 
Hart Publishing, online: Bloomsbury <www.bloomsburyprofessional.com/uk/
courts-without-cases-9781509922499>.
5. Mathen, supra note 1 at 205.
6. Ibid. 
7. Ibid at 208.
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laid out a mechanism to provide advice,8 all the way through early Canadian 
references, such as the Manitoba Education Reference of 1894.9 Mathen gathers 
this history to provide strong support for the conclusion that advisory opinions 
have developed a binding character and “occupy the same procedural space as 
cases.”10 By the time she delves into analysis of modern cases, the reader has a 
solid understanding of the historic forces that give the reference power its status 
in Canadian law. 
In fewer than 250 pages, Mathen tackles the reference power from every 
angle. She provides sophisticated, plain-language explanations of foundational 
constitutional law concepts that the courts have explored through the use of 
references: the separation of powers,11 federalism (Re Marriage),12 minority 
rights (Re Bill 30),13 the rule of law (Re Manitoba Language Rights),14 statutory 
interpretation (the Persons case),15 and questions of fundamental justice and the 
criminal law (Motor Vehicle).16 This sweeping review makes clear that advisory 
opinions have been sought on many significant questions of public law and civic 
life. By the time you finish reading this work, it is evident how central reference 
cases have been in the development of Canadian law. Even those who have been 
“notably suspicious of judicial power” have accepted that the reference is the 
mechanism by which government actors can seek “guidance” and “finality” 
on questions of fundamental import.17
In contrast, Kate Puddister’s monograph, Seeking the Court’s Advice: The Politics 
of the Canadian Reference Power, offers a more technical political scientist’s view on 
the matter.18 As Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the 
University of Guelph, Puddister brings quantitative research methods to bear on 
the subject. It is refreshing to have a perspective on a major legal issue from outside 
8. Ibid at 32. 
9. Ibid at 210; In re Certain Statutes of the Province of Manitoba relating to Education, (1894) 22 
SCR 577 [Manitoba Education Reference].
10. Mathen, supra note 1 at 206. 
11. Ibid at 20. 
12. Ibid at 87. In re Marriage Laws, [1912] SCR 132 [In re Marriage (SCC)].
13. Mathen, supra note 1 at 148; Reference re Bill 30, An Act to Amend the Education Act (Ont), 
[1987] 1 SCR 1148 [Re Bill 30].
14. Mathen, supra note 1 at 144; Manitoba Act, 1870, RSC 1970, App II.
15. Mathen, supra note 1 at 132; Edwards v Attorney General (Canada) [1930] AC 124, 1929 
UKPC 86 [Persons Case].
16. Mathen, supra note 1 at 140; Re BC Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 SCR 486 [Re Motor Vehicle].
17. Mathen, supra note 1 at 179; Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss 5 and 6, 2014 SCC 21 
[Supreme Court Act Reference].
18. Puddister, supra note 1. 
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the epistemic community of lawyers and legal academics. As this community 
often jokingly laments its own lack of mathematical expertise, it is helpful to have 
a number-cruncher from another discipline provide a quantitative analysis of a 
legal phenomenon, so that our understanding of references can be enhanced by 
conclusions drawn from statistical analysis. This is where Puddister’s work shines 
and serves as worthwhile complement to Mathen’s book. 
Seeking the Court’s Advice opens with an anecdote about how constitutional 
questions can rear their head in “unexpected or unusual” places.19 Puddister tells 
the story of the “chicken or egg” war between Ontario, Québec, and Manitoba 
in the 1960s that culminated in the Reference re Manitoba (AG) v. Manitoba 
Egg and Poultry Association, or the Egg Reference.20 However, this case is not so 
odd or quirky when framed by Professor Puddister—it is not “puzzling” that 
inter-provincial agricultural disputes would be fertile ground for a reference case. 
This well-chosen example illustrates how reference questions can be brought by 
governments strategically and cleverly in pursuit of their political objectives.
Puddister deploys this methodology to explain the reference power, not just 
at the Supreme Court of Canada, but in Canada’s appellate courts, making it 
the more comprehensive quantitative review of the subject. Puddister’s book 
is a worthwhile read for legal academics and practitioners who participate in 
references on behalf of interveners, and government officials who seek to 
understand how their predecessors have used the reference power as a tool to 
advance their political objectives.
Puddister’s thesis is that “governments ask reference questions to benefit 
strategically from the unique characteristics of the reference power and to draw 
on some of the advantages inherent in judicial review.”21 Here, our two books 
have some overlapping content. Each author offers a list of distinct reasons that 
governments have historically chosen to put an issue to reference as an alternative 
to other methods of changing the law. Their lists are similar, and complementary 
without being contradictory.
In chapter nine, Actors, Advice, and Law, Mathen examines why advisory 
opinions have been sought by stakeholders. Her list includes: doctrinal guidance; 
co-ordination of social aims and projects; strategy (including pre-emption, e.g., 
of anticipated legislation, and displacement, to deflect pressure between competing 
power sites); and imprimatur, which Mathen says, is where “actors can trade on 
19. Ibid at 3.
20. Ibid at 3-5; [1971] SCR 689.
21. Ibid at 13.
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the special legitimacy and power of the court which they, largely, lack.”22 Mathen 
provides case examples for each. For example, the section on imprimatur looks 
at the Same-sex Marriage Reference and how the federal government overcame 
instability in its own ranks and rapidly changing social norms by deferring to the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s authority.23
Puddister’s examination is slightly different. First, she suggests, governments 
see that the reference power can be deployed strategically, as a way to abdicate 
responsibility for making difficult decisions on thorny cases, saving them the 
“unnecessary expenditure of political capital.”24 Second, they are used to clarify 
powers in the context of federalism. Third, they are a defensive maneuver, 
to “benefit from the institutional authority and protection of the courts.”25 
As such, references can provide “position legitimization,” as the public regards 
courts more highly than it does the partisan governments of the day.26 Fourth, 
references are heard far more quickly than ordinary cases that escalate through 
judicial review up to the higher appellate levels.27 Lastly, governments can carefully 
craft the language of reference questions to prod courts into providing suitable 
answers.28 All five of these strands are well supported by Puddister’s research. 
Mathen’s analysis goes further, however, as she examines actors’ motivations, 
not only to seek advisory opinions, but their decisions on whether to comply. 
In chapter nine, having already concluded that stakeholders see reference 
outcomes as binding, she draws on legal theory to deepen her explanation of 
why stakeholders are motivated to treat these outcomes as rules. She looks at 
Joseph Raz (“advice” vs. “order”),29 and John Austin’s command theory,30 as well 
as H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin on rules and principles, to support her 
analysis of what constitutes legal authority and from where advisory opinions 
draw their normative force.31 This section of the book would be useful for law 
students who want to link their study of jurisprudence with a salient issue in 
Canadian law, and to understand why the binding character of references is such 
a thorny issue in the first place. 
22. Mathen, supra note 1 at 190.
23. Ibid at 191; Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, 2004 SCC 79.
24. Puddister, supra note 1 at 184.
25. Ibid at 13.
26. Ibid at 121.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid. 
29. Mathen, supra note 1 at 193.
30. Ibid at 197. 
31. Ibid at 189-204. 
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Puddister’s book differs most from Mathen’s in its methodology and scope. 
Though Mathen’s book analyses language from cases like Reference Re Secession 
of Québec to explore how the highest Court conceptualises its own reference 
jurisdiction,32 Puddister takes a different approach. She does not engage in 
line-by-line analysis of judicial reasoning in cases where the Supreme Court 
of Canada reflects on the justiciability of abstract reference questions. Instead, 
the data-driven portion of her study focuses on quantitative review. She also 
interviews participants in the reference process, and only briefly offers a historical 
analysis of select illustrative case examples.
In her first few chapters, Puddister engages in a quantitative analysis of data 
taken from all 209 references cases that have come before the courts from 1875 
to 2017.33 She uses graphs and tables to great effect in outlining trends across 
references over time, drawing meaningful conclusions and acknowledging the 
limitations of the data where necessary. A variety of metrics are used to help 
explain how courts respond when reference questions are put forward: the court’s 
disposition in each case;34 the instances of unanimity and division in reference 
decisions;35 and which political parties have historically brought the most 
references when they have taken power federally and provincially.36 She tracks 
which provinces have brought the most and the least reference cases.37 She also 
explains the reasons behind the data, for example, showing that the number of 
federal references jumped in the 1930s,38 and then providing background on how 
this came to pass—this particular peak, she explains, occurred because William 
Lyon Mackenzie King’s government emphasized this form of strategic litigation 
to advance its goals.39 
Puddister also provides insight into trends in the subject matter of reference 
cases. From 1949 to 2017, she concludes, just over 50 per cent of references 
have dealt with issues pertaining to the Constitution Act, 1867, the majority of 
these on division of powers questions.40 Following that, statutory interpretation 
cases constitute 26.8 per cent of cases. A surprisingly small percentage of cases 
32. Ibid at 158. 
33. Puddister, supra note 1, ch 2-3.
34. Ibid at 83.
35. Ibid at 84.
36. Ibid at 106.
37. Ibid at 45. 
38. Ibid at 46. 
39. Ibid at 59. 
40. Ibid at 80.
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are Charter-related, representing 17.5 per cent of the total.41 Puddister explains 
that, in addition to the Charter being a newer instrument, and therefore the 
subject of less judicial treatment, “many of the issues that can arise concerning 
the compatibility of government legislation with the Charter are often dealt with 
by courts through routine litigation.”42 Puddister also finds that references had a 
55.7 per cent unanimity rate, which is actually lower than the unanimity rate that 
is found at the Supreme Court of Canada and appellate courts on typical cases.43 
This data buttresses our understanding of how and when issues have been pulled 
out of the traditional adversarial process and become the subject of reference 
opinions, and how the courts have handled them. Her conclusions will help 
future governments make informed requests for references from appellate courts. 
Puddister’s chapter four, “It’s Always A Little Bit of Politics”: Why Governments 
Ask Reference Questions, draws on interviews with counsel, judges, and provincial 
Attorneys General who have been involved in bringing reference cases before 
the courts. This is the only section of the book that disappoints. Although 
quotes provided by interviewees provide worthwhile insight, Puddister’s 
decision to allow these contributors to remain anonymous—referring to them as 
“Counsel B” or “Attorney General C”—feels unnecessary. None of the quotes are 
provocative enough to merit non-attribution. “When a reference is referred, it’s 
the government deciding that this is a political hot potato,” Attorney General D 
explains.44 Attorney General C discusses how the reference power can be a useful 
tool in the context of federalism to bring the other government to the negotiating 
table.45 These remarks are hardly explosive. In her endnotes, Puddister wrote that 
“confidentiality was a condition to gaining access to the participants.”46 However, 
one wonders if she might have pressed harder to have these sources go on the 
record to allow the reader to contextualise their remarks. Though this decision 
may spring from academic research ethics rules, it does the reader a disservice. 
Knowing which reference case(s) the interviewee worked on, the period in which 
they were operating, and their political inclinations would benefit the reader. 
Ultimately, however, these interviews do significant work to buttress the author’s 
thesis: that politics is front and centre in governmental decisions to put reference 
questions before the courts. 
41. Ibid. 
42. Ibid at 81. 
43. Ibid at 84. 
44. Ibid at 126.
45. Ibid at 129.
46. Ibid at 246.
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Veering away from her quantitative focus, Puddister offers chapter five, Why 
Not Refer Everything? The Padlock Act and Blasphemy. This chapter examines two 
significant cases where the government opted against the use of the reference 
power. The most intriguing of the two examples is the account of the dispute over 
the Québec Padlock Act of 1937, formally known as An Act to Protect the Province 
Against Communistic Propaganda, which “empowered the attorney general…to 
direct the police to lock any residence or building that was used to disseminate 
bolshevism or communism through any means.”47 All students of public law 
relish the opportunity to explore the constitutional implications of the Duplessis 
government’s excesses. Professor Puddister is one. She selected this case as an 
example of a federal government torn over whether a reference—or another of 
the myriad options available to them—would be the best method to address a 
potential civil liberties crisis. In describing Prime Minister King’s and Attorney 
General Lapointe’s equivocation, Puddister explains how their government 
eschewed the reference power and sought to use another tool in their arsenal to 
address objectionable provincial legislation.48 These two case studies are used to 
great effect to explain how the strengths and weaknesses of the reference power 
have been conceived of historically. This is the part of the book that most overlaps 
with Mathen’s work, which also zeroes in on important episodes of this nature. 
Near the end of her book, Puddister argues that, though the reference power 
is technically non-binding, deference to a court’s reference opinion is almost 
guaranteed and can be relied upon by all stakeholders—that Canadians “often 
see the courts as infallible on any controversy regarding the Constitution.”49 
However, because Puddister’s research concluded in 2017, her position that the 
“the ineffectual status of the notwithstanding clause negates the most powerful 
tool legislators have for upholding a constitutional interpretation that deviates 
from that of the courts” must be re-examined.50 At the time that she wrote 
this book, she concluded that section 33 seemed to be “de facto inoperative.”51 
Professor Mathen, by contrast, recognized that section 33 can “be used to 
deliberately disregard a legal directive,” and though she notes that it has been 
used sparingly, she argues that “there is a general sense that the clause remains 
an available (albeit controversial) option for the various Canadian legislatures 
47. Ibid at 151.
48. Ibid at 151-62.
49. Ibid at 207.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid. 
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to consider.”52 In 2020, as the notwithstanding clause has come roaring back 
into the mainstream, one wonders if Professor Puddister would still argue that 
the courts’ conclusions on highly contested constitutional questions would be 
respected by all federal or provincial governments as the final word.53 
The reference power is enjoying its moment in the spotlight. Courts Without 
Cases and Seeking the Court’s Advice will likely affect the way the power is exercised 
and conceived of by governments, interveners, and courts. These two authors have 
brought complementary methods to bear on a subject that deserves attention 
from all corners of the legal world. Carissima Mathen and Kate Puddister’s work 
enriches our understanding of Canadian courts and how they operate. 
52. Mathen, supra note 1 at 195-96. 
53. The notwithstanding clause was invoked periodically in the period preceding the publication 
of this work, e.g., by the Saskatchewan Legislature. See Good Spirit School Division No 204 
v Christ The Teacher Roman Catholic Separate School Division No 212, 2017 SKQB 109. 
The clause has since been a significant factor in the Québec laïcité discussion. See Hak c 
Procureure générale du Québec, 2019 QCCA 2145. 

